The poverty of historicism pdf

Open Library is a project of the Internet Archive , a c 3 non-profit. On its publication in , The Poverty of Historicism was hailed by Arthur Koestler as 'probably the only book published this year which will outlive the century. One of the most important books on the social sciences since the Second World War, it is a searing insight into the ideas of this great thinker. Previews available in: English.

Add another edition? Copy and paste this code into your Wikipedia page. Need help? The poverty of historicism. Karl Popper. Donate this book to the Internet Archive library. If you own this book, you can mail it to our address below. Not in Library. Want to Read. Buy this book Better World Books When you buy books using these links the Internet Archive may earn a small commission. Share this book Facebook. Last edited by dcapillae. October 10, History. An edition of The Poverty of Historicism It has therefore been suggested that while the methods of the natural sciences are fundamentally nominalistic, social science must adopt a methodological essentialism?

Every important sociological entity presupposes uni- versal terms for its description and it would be point- less freely to introduce new terms, as has been done so successfully in the natural sciences. The task of social science is to describe such entities clearly and properly, i.

Although historicists may differ in their attitude towards the metaphysical issue, and in their opinion with regard to the methodology of natural science, it is clear that they will be inclined to side with essentialism and against nominalism so far as the methodology of social science is concerned. In fact, nearly every historicist I know of takes this attitude. But it is worth considering whether it is only the general anti-natural- istic tendency of historicism that accounts for this, or whether there are any specific historicist arguments that may be urged in favour of methodological essentialism.

Nominalism In the first place it is clear that the argument against the use of quantitative methods in social science is relevant to this issue. The emphasis on the qualitative character of social events, together with the emphasis on intuitive understanding as opposed to mere descrip- tion , indicates an attitude closely related to essentialism.

But there are other arguments, more typical of historicism, which follow a trend of thought that will by now be familiar to the reader. Incidentally, they are practically the same arguments as those which, according to Aristotle, led Plato to develop the first theory of essences. Historicism stresses the importance of change. Now in every change, the historicist might argue, there must be something that changes. Even if nothing remains unchanged, we must be able to identify what has changed in order to speak of change at all.

This is comparatively easy in physics. In mechanics, for ex- ample, all changes are movements, i. But sociology, which is chiefly interested in social institutions, faces greater difficulties, for such institutions are not so easy to identify after they have undergone change. In the simple descriptive sense it is not possible to regard a social institution before a change as the same as that institution after a change; it might, from the descriptive point of view, be entirely different.

A naturalistic description of contemporary institutions of govern- ment in Britcdn, for example, might have to present them as entirely different from what they were four centuries ago.

Yet we can say that, in so far as there is a government, it is essentially the same, even although it may have changed considerably. Its function within modern society is essentially analogous to the function it then fulfilled. Though hardly any describable features have remained the same, the essential identity of the 31 Anti-Naturalistic Doctrines [I institution is preserved, permitting us to regard one institution as a changed form of the other: we cannot speak, in the social sciences, of changes or develop- ments without presupposing an unchanging essence, and hence without proceeding in accordance with methodological essentialism.

It is plain, of course, that some sociological terms, such as depression, inflation, deflation, etc. But even so they have not retained their nominalistic character. As conditions change, we soon find social scientists disagreeing about whether certain pheno- mena are really inflations or not; thus for the sake of precision it may become necessary to investigate the essential nature or the essential meaning of inflation.

The extent of possible changes cannot be limited a priori. It is impossible to say what sort of change a social entity can withstand and yet remain the same. Phenomena which from some standpoints may be essentially different, may from others be essentially the same. From the historicist arguments developed above, it follows that a bare description of social developments is impossible; or rather, that a sociological description can never be merely a description in the nominalist sense.

And if a sociological description cannot dispense with essences, a theory of social development will be even less able to do so. For who would deny that problems such as the determination and explanation of the characteristic features of a certain social period, together with its tensions and intrinsic tendencies and 32 lo] Essentialism vs.

Mominalism trends, must defy all attempts at treatment by nomin- alist methods? Methodological essentialism can accordingly be based on the historicist argument which actually led Plato to his metaphysical essentialism, the Heraclitean argument that changing things defy rational descrip- tion.

Hence science or knowledge presupposes some- thing that does not change but remains identical with itself — an essence. History, i. But this correlation has yet another side: in a certain sense, an essence also presupposes change, and thereby history.

For if that principle of a thing which remains identical or unchanged when the thing changes is its essence or idea, or form, or nature, or substance , then the changes which the thing undergoes bring to light diflferent sides or aspects or possibilities of the thing and therefore of its essence.

The essence, accord- ingly, can be interpreted as the sum or source of the potentialities inherent in the thing, and the changes or movements can be interpreted as the realization or actualization of the hidden potentialities of its essence. This theory is due to Aristotle. It follows that a thing, i. If, for instance, we want to find out whether a certain thing is made of gold, we have to beat it, or to test it chemically, thus changing it and thereby unfolding some of its hidden potentialities.

In the same way, the essence of a man — his personality — can only be known as it unfolds itself in his biography. Applying this principle to sociology we are led to the conclusion that the essence or the real character, of a social group can reveal itself, and be known, only through its history.

But if social groups can be known only through their history, the concepts used to 33 Anti-Naturalistic Doctrines [I describe them must be historical concepts; and indeed, such sociological concepts as the Japanese state or the Italian nation or the Aryan race can hardly be inter- preted as anything but concepts based on the study of history.

The same is valid for social classes: the bour- geoisie, for instance, can only be defined by its history: as the class that came to power through the industrial revolution, that pushed aside the landlords, and that is fighting and being fought by the proletariat, etc. Essentialism may have been introduced on the ground that it enables us to detect an identity in things that change, but it furnishes in its turn some of the most powerful arguments in support of the doctrine that the social sciences must adopt a historical method; that is to say, in support of the doctrine of historicism.

By saying that it is a theoretical discipline we mean that sociology has to explain and to predict events, with the help of theories or of universal laws which it tries to discover. By describing sociology as empirical, we mean to say that it is backed by experience, that the events it explains and predicts are observable facts, and that observation is the basis for the acceptance or re- jection of any propounded theory.

When we speak of success in physics we have in mind the success of its predictions: and the success of its predictions can be said to be the same as the empirical corroboration of the laws of physics.

When we contrast the relative 35 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [II success of sociology with the success of physics, then we are assuming that success in sociology would like- wise consist, basically, in the corroboration of pre- dictions.

It follows that certain methods — prediction with the help of laws, and the testing of laws by observa- tion — must be common to physics and sociology. I fully agree with this view, in spite of the fact that I consider it one of the basic assumptions of historicism. But I do not agree with the more detailed develop- ment of this view which leads to a number of ideas which I shall describe in what follows. At first sight these ideas might appear to be fairly straightforward consequences of the general view just outlined.

But in fact, they involve other assumptions, namely, the anti- naturalistic doctrines of historicism; and more especi- ally, the doctrine of historical laws or trends. The possibility of such long-term forecasts, they claim, is thereby established, showing that the old dreams of prophesying the distant future do not transcend the limits of what may be attained by the human mind.

The social sciences must aim just as high. If it is possible for astronomy to predict eclipses, why should it not be possible for sociology to predict revolutions? An exact scientific calendar of social events, comparable to, say, the Nautical Almanack, has been shown in sections 5 and 6 to be logically impossible.

Even though revolu- tions may be predicted by the social sciences, no such prediction can be exact; there must be a margin of uncertainty as to its details and as to its timing.

While conceding, and even emphasizing, the defici- encies of sociological predictions with respect to detail and precision, historicists hold that the sweep and the significance of such forecasts might compensate for these drawbacks. The deficiencies arise mainly from the complexity of social events, from their interconnec- tions, and from the qualitative character of socio- logical terms.

But although social science in conse- quence suffers from vagueness, its qualitative terms at the same time provide it with a certain richness and comprehensiveness of meaning. Predictions of the kind described, i. Accord- ing to historicism, this is the kind of prediction which sociology has to attempt. It is certainly true that such large-scale forecasts — long-term forecasts of a wide range and possibly some- what vague — can be achieved in some sciences.

In- stances of important and fairly successful large-scale prediction can be found within the field of astronomy. Examples are the prediction of sun-spot activity on the basis of periodic laws significant for climatic vari- ations or of daily and seasonal changes in the ioniz- ation of the upper atmosphere significant for wireless communication. These resemble eclipse predictions in so far as they deal with events in a comparatively 37 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [ii distant future, but they differ from them in being often merely statistical and in any case less exact with respect to details, timing, and other 'features.

We see that large-scale predictions are not perhaps impracticable in themselves; and if long-term forecasts are at all attainable by the social sciences then it is fairly clear that they can only be what we have described as large- scale forecasts. On the other hand, it follows from our exposition of the anti-naturalistic doctrines of histori- cism that short-term predictions in the social sciences must suffer from great disadvantages.

Lack of exactness must affect them considerably, for by their very nature they can deal only with details, with the smaller fea- tures of social life, since they are confined to brief periods. But a prediction of details which is inexact in its details is pretty useless. Thus, if we are at all inter- ested in social predictions, large-scale forecasts which are also long-term forecasts remain, according to historicism, not only the most fascinating but actually the only forecasts worth attempting.

That is so even with the observational basis of astronomy. The facts on which astronomy is based are contained in the records of the observatory; records which inform us, for instance, that at such and such a date hour, second the planet Mercury has been ob- served by Mr.

So-and-so in a certain position. Similarly, the observational basis of sociology can be given only in the form of a chronicle of events, namely of political or social happenings. History in this narrow sense is the basis of sociology. It would be ridiculous to deny the importance of history in this narrow sense as an empirical basis for social science. But one of the characteristic claims of historicism which is closely associated with its denial of the applicability of the experimental method, is that history, political and social, is the only empirical source of sociology.

Thus the historicist visualizes sociology as a theoretical and empirical disciphne whose empirical basis is formed by a chronicle of die facts of history alone, and whose aim is to make forecasts, preferably large-scale forecasts.

Clearly, these forecasts must also be of a historical character, since their testing by experience, their verification or refutation, must be left to future history. Thus the making and testing of large-scale historical forecasts is the task of sociology as seen by historicism. In brief, the historicist claims that sociology is theoretical history. The part of astronomy which historicists usually consider, celestial mechanics, is based on dynamics, the theory of motions as deter- mined by forces.

Historicist writers have often insisted that sociology should be based in a similar way on a social dynamics, the theory of socizd movement as determined by social or historical forces. Statics, the physicist knows, is only an abstraction from dynamics; it is, as it were, the theory of how and why, under certain circumstances, nothing happens, i.

Dynamics, on the 39 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [11 other hand, deals with the general case, i. Thus, only dynamics can give us the real, universally valid laws of mechanics; for nature is process; it moves, changes, develops — although sometimes only slowly, so that some developments may be difficult to observe.

But, the historicist might claim, the analogy goes deeper. He might claim, for instance, that soci- ology, as conceived by historicism, is akin to dynamics because it is essentially a causal theory; for causal explanation in general is an explanation of how and why certain things happened. Basically, such an ex- planation must always have an historical element. If you ask someone who has broken his leg how and why it happened, you expect that he will tell you the history of the accident.

But even on the level of theo- retical thought, and especially on the level of theories permitting prediction, a historical analysis of the causes of an event is necessary.

A typical example of the need for a historical causal analysis, the historicist will assert, is the problem of the origins, or the essential causes, of war. In physics, such an analysis is achieved by a deter- mination of the interacting forces, i.

It has to analyse the forces which produce social change and create human his- tory. From dynamics we learn how the interacting forces constitute new forces; and conversely, by analysing forces into their components, we are able to penetrate into the more fundamental causes of the events under consideration.

Similarly, historicism de- mands the recogmtion of the fundamental importance 40 14] Historical Laws of historical forces, whether spiritual or material; for example, religious or ethical ideas, or economic inter- ests. To analyse, to disentangle this thicket of conflict- ing tendencies and forces and to penetrate to its roots, to the universal driving forces and laws of social change — this is the task of the social sciences, as seen by his- toricism.

Only in this way can we develop a theoretical science on which to base those large-scale forecasts whose confirmation would mean the success of social theory. Its scientific forecasts must be based on laws, and since they are historical forecasts, forecasts of social change, they must be based on historical laws. But at the same time the historicist holds that the method of generalization is inapplicable to social science, and that we must not assume uniformities of social life to be invariably valid through space and time, since they usually apply only to a certain cultural or historical period.

But this can only mean that they apply to the whole of human history, covering all of its periods rather than merely some of them. But there can be no social uniformities which hold good beyond single periods. Thus the only universally valid laws of society must be the laws which link up the successive periods. They must be laws of historical development w aich.

This is what historicists mean by saying that the only real laws of sociology are historical laws. And it makes this idea more concrete, for it shows that these forecasts have the character of historical prophecies.

Sociology thus becomes, to the historicist, an attempt to solve the old problem of foretelling the future; not so much the future of the individual as that of groups, and of the human race. It is the science of things to come, of impending developments. If the attempt to furnish us with political foresight of scientific validity were to succeed, then sociology would prove to be of the greatest value to politicians, especially to those whose vision extends beyond the exigencies of the present, to politicians with a sense of historic destiny.

Some historicists, it is true, are content to predict only the next stages of the human pilgrimage, and even these in very cautious terms. But one idea is common to them all — that sociological study should help to reveal the political future, and that it could thereby become the foremost iiKtrument of far-sighted practical politics.

From the point of view of the pragmatic value of science, the significance of scientific predictions is clear enough. It has not always been realized, however, that two different kinds of prediction can be distinguished in science, and accordingly two different ways of being 42 15] Prophecy vs. Engineering practical. These two kinds of predictions are obviously very different although both are important and fulfil age- old dreams.

In the one case we are told about an event which we can do nothing to prevent. Its practical value lies in our being warned of the predicted event, so that we can side-step it or meet it prepared possibly with the help of predictions of the other kind.

Opposed to these are predictions of the second kind which we can describe as technological predictions since predictions of this kind form a basis of engineering. They are, so to speak, constructive, intimating the steps open to us if we want to achieve certain results.

The greater part of physics nearly the whole of it apart from astronomy and meteorology makes predictions of such a form that, considered from a practical stand- point, they can be described as technological pre- diction. The distinction between these two sorts of prediction roughly coincides with the lesser or greater importance of the part played by designed experi- ment, as opposed to mere patient observation, in the science concerned.

The typical experimental sciences are capable of making technological predictions, while those employing mainly non-experimental observa- tions produce prophecies. I do not wish to be taken as implying that all sciences, or even all scientific predictions, are funda- mentally practical — that they are necessarily either prophetic or technological and cannot be' anything 43 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [II else.

I only want to draw attention to a distinction between the two kinds of prediction and the sciences corresponding to them. It is worth noting that this difference between the prophetic and the engineering character of sciences does not correspond to the difference between long-term and short-term predictions.

Although most engineering predictions are short-term there are also long-term technological predictions, for instance, about the life- time of an engine.

Again, astronomical prophecies may be dther short-term or long-term, and most meteor- ological prophecies are comparatively short-term. The idea of social engineer- 44 1 6 ] The Theory of Historical Development ing, the planning and construction of institutions, with the aim, perhaps, of arresting or of controlling or of quickening impending social developments, appears to some historicists as possible.

To others, this would seem an almost impossible undertaking, or one which overlooks the fact that political planning, like all social activity, must stand under the superior sway of his- torical forces. Social science is nothing but history: this is the thesis. Not, however, history in the traditional sense of a mere chronicle of historical facts.

The kind of history with which historicists wish to identify sociology looks not only backwards to the past but also forwards to the future. It is the study of the operative forces and, above all, of the laws of social development. Accordingly, it could be described as historical theory, or as theoretical history, since the only universally valid social laws have been identified as historical laws. They must be laws of process, of change, of development — not the pseudo-laws of apparent constancies or uniformities.

According to historicists, sociologists must try to get a general idea of the broad trends in accordance with which social structures change. But besides this, they should try to understand the causes of this process, the working of the forces responsible for change. They should tvy to formulate hypotheses about general trends underlying social development, in order that men may adjust themselves to impending changes by deducing prophecies from these laws.

In opposition to the histoiicist methodology, we could conceive of a methodology which aims at a techno- logical social science. Such a methodology would lead to the study of the general laws of social life with the aim of finding all those facts which would be indispensable as a basis for the work of everyone seeking to reform social institutions. There is no doubt that such facts exist.

We know many Utopian systems, for instance, which are impracticable simply because they do not consider such facts sufficiently. The technological methodology we are considering would aim at fur- nishing means of avoiding such unrealistic construc- tior«.

Historical experience would serve it as a. But, instead of trying to find laws of social development, it would look for the various laws which impose limitations upon the construction of social institutions, or for other uttformities though these, the histoiicist says, do not exist.

As well as using counter-arguments of a kind already discussed, the historicist could question the possibility and the utility of such a social technology in another way. Even so, historicist arguments can show 46 1 6] The Theory of Historical Development that such a plan would deserve no serious consider- ation. It would still remain an unrealistic and Utopian dream, just because it does not take account of the laws of historical development.

Social revolutions are j. The old idea of a powerful philosopher-king who would put into practice some carefully thought out plans was a fairy-tale invented in the interest of a land-owning aris- tocracy. The democratic equivalent of this fairy-tale is the superstition that enough people of good will may be persuaded by rational argument to take planned action.

History shows that the social reality is quite different. The course of historical development is never shaped by theoretical constructions, however excellent, although such schemes might, admittedly, exert some influence, along with many other less rational or even quite irrational factors. Even if such a rational p lan coincides with the interests of powerful groups it will never be realized in the way in which it was conceived, in spite of the fact that the struggle for its realization would then become a major factor in the historical process.

The real outcome will always be very diffemxt from the rational construction. It will always be the resultant of the momentary constellation of contesting forces.

Furthermore, under no circumstances could the outcome of rational planning become a stable structure; for the balance of forces is bound to change. All social engineering, no matter how much it prides itself on its realism and on its scientific character, is doomed to remain a Utopian dream. So far, the historicist would continue, the argument has been directed against the practical possibility of social engineering backed by some theoretical social science, and not against the idea of such a science it- self.

It can easily be extended, however, so as to prove 47 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [11 the impossibility of any theoretical social science of the technological kind. We have seen that practical engineering ventures must be doomed to failure on account of very important sociological facts and laws. But this implies not only that such a venture has no practical value but also that it is theoretically un- sound, since it overlooks the only really important social laws — the laws of development.

Any social science which does not teach the impossibility of rational social construction is entirely blind to the most important facts of social life, and must overlook the only social laws of real validity and of real im- portance.

Social sciences seeking to provide a back- ground for social engineering cannot, therefore, be true descriptions of social facts. They are impossible in themselves. The historicist will claim that besides this decisive criticism there are other reasons for rejecting techno- -4— - logical sociologies.

One reason is, for example, that they neglect such aspects of the social development as the emergence of novelty. The idea that we can construct new social structures rationally on a scientific basis implies that we can bring into existence a new social period more or less precisely in the way we have planned it. Yet if the plan is based on a science that covers social facts, it cannot account for intrinsically new features, only for newness of arrangement see section 3.

But we know that a new period will have its own intrinsic novelty — an argument which must render any detailed planning futile, and any science upon which it is grounded untrue. These historicist considerations can be applied to all social sciences, including economics. Economics, there- 48 17] Interpreting vs.

Planning fore, cannot give us any valuable information con- cerning social reform. Only a pseudo-economics can seek to offer a background for rational economic plan- ning. Truly scientific economics can merely help to reveal the driving forces of economic development through different historical periods.

It may help us to foresee the outlines of future periods, but it cannot help us to develop and put into operation any detailed plan for any new period. What holds for the other social sciences must hold for economics. Historicism fully recognizes that our wishes and thoughts, our dreams and our reasoning, our fears and our know- ledge, our interests and our energies, are all forces in the development of society.

It does not teach that nothing can be brought about; it only predicts that neither your dreams nor what your reason constructs will ever be brought about according to plan. Only such plans as fit in with the main current of history can be effective. We can now see exactly the sort of activity admitted by historicists to be reasonable.

Only such activities are reasonable as fit in with, and help along, the impending changes. Social midwifery is the only perfectly reasonable activity open to us, the only activity that can be based upon scientific foresight. Although no scientific theory as such can directly encourage activity it could only discourage certain 49 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [11 activities as unrealistic , it can, by implication, give encouragement to those who feel that they ought to do something.

Historicism definitely offers this Idnd of encouragement. It even gives human reason a certain part to play; for it is scientific reasoning, historicist social science, which alone can tell us the direction any reasonable activity must take if it is to coincide with the direction of impending changes.

Historical prophecy and the interpretation of his- tory must thus become the basis of any thought-out and realistic social action. Consequently, interpretation of history must be the central job of historicist thought; and in point of fact it has become so.

All the thoughts and all the activities of historicists aim at interpreting the past, in order to predict the future. Can historicism offer hope or encouragement to those who want to see a better world? But this view would amount to a belief in social and political miracles, since it denies to human reason the power of bringing about a more reasonable world.

In fact, some influential historicist writers have optimistically foretold the coming of a realm of free- dom, in which human affairs could be planned ration- ally. And they teach that the transition from the realm of necessity in which mankind at present suffers to the realm of fireedom and reason cannot be brought about by reason but miraculously — only by harsh necessity, by the blind and inexorable laws of historical develop- ment, to which they counsel us to submit.

Those who desire an increase in the influence of reason in social life can only be advised by historicism to study and interpret history, in order to discover the 50 1 7] Interpreting vs. Planning laws of its development. If such interpretation reveals that changes answering to their desire are impending, then the desire is a reasonable one, for it agrees with scientific prediction.

If the impending development happens to tend in another direction, then the wish to make the world more reasonable turns out to be en- tirely unreasonable; to historicists it is then just a Utopian dream. Activism can be justified only so long as it acquiesces in impending changes and helps them along. I have already shown that the naturalistic method, as seen by historicism, implies a definite sociological theory — the theory that society does not significantly develop or change.

We now find that the historicist method implies a strangely similar sociological theory — the theory that society will necessarily change but along a predetermined path that cannot change, through stages predetermined by inexorable necessity. But this much it can do: it can shorten and lessen the birth- pangs. Although it teaches neither inactivity nor real fa talism, historicism teaches the futility of any attempt to alter impending changes; a peculiar variety of fatahsm, a fatalism in regard to the trends of history, as it were.

But it is in conflict with the most significant doctrines of historicism. For these formulations try to show that the leanings of some historicists towards optimism or activism are defeated by the outcome of the historicist analysis itself This may seem to imply the charge that historicism is inconsistent.

And it may be objected that it is not fair to allow criticism and irony to creep into an exposition. I do not think this reproach would be just, however. Only those who are optimists or activists first, and historicists afterwards, can take my remarks as critical in an adverse sense.

There will be many who feel in this way: those who were originally attracted to his- toricism because of their leanings towards optimism or activism. But to those who are primarily historicists, my remarks ought to appear not as a criticism of their historicist doctrines but only as a criticism of attempts to link it with optimism or activism.

Not all the forms of activism are thus criticized as incompatible with historicism, to be sure, but only some of its more extravagant forms. As compared with a naturalistic method, a pure historicist would argue, historicism does encourage activity, because of its stress on change, process, motion; yet it certainly can- not blindly coimtenance all kinds of activities as being 52 1 8 ] Conclusion of the Analysis reasonable from a scientific point of view; many possible activities are unrealistic, and their failure can be foreseen by science.

This, he would say, is the reason why he and other historicists impose limitations on the scope of what they can admit to be useful activity, and why an emphasis upon these limitations is necessary for any clear analysis of historicism.

It seems to me for these reasons that my exposition is not unfair, but that it merely clears the ground in regard to activism. Similarly, I do not think that my other remark in the foregoing section, to the effect that historicist optimism must rest on faith alone since reason is denied the role of bringing about a more reasonable world , is to be considered as an adverse criticism of historicism.

It may appear adverse to those who are primarily optimists or rationalists. But the consistent historicist will see in this analysis only a useful warning against the romantic and Utopian character of both optimism and pessimism in their usual forms, and of rationalism too. He will insist that a truly scientific historicism must be independent of such elements; that we simply have to submit to the existing laws of development, just as we have to submit to the law of gravity.

The historicist may even go further. He may add that the most reasonable attitude to adopt is so to 53 Pro-Naturalistic Doctrines [11 adjust one's system of values as to make it conform with the impending changes. If this is done, one arrives at a form of optimism which can be justified, since any change will then necessarily be a change for the better, if judged by that system of values.

Ideas of this kind have actually been held by some historicists, and have even been developed into a fairly coherent and quite popular historicist moral theory: the morally good is the morally progressive, i. Or, to put it in another way: it seems not improbable that the histori- cist method might have originated as a part of a general philosophical interpretation of the world.

For there can be no doubt that, firom the standpoint of history although not of logic, methodologies are usually by- products of philosophical views. I intend to examine these historicist philosophies elsewhere. The Open Society and Its Enemies has been published. I was here alluding especially to ch. For its defence, see T. Huxley, Science and Culture , p. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

In his book, The Poverty of Historicism, Sir Karl Popper presents a famous polemic against the so-called doctrine of historicism. It is widely believed that Popper wreaked irrevocable damage on this … Expand.

Historicism and the green backlash: a study of Julian Simon and Bjorn Lomborg. Popper described the core of 20th century ideologies of the far right and left as 'historicism' — the false belief that social development is literally determined by material factors and that every … Expand. The poverty of rhetoricism: Popper, Mises and the riches of historicism. The attacks on historicism by radical individualists such as Popper and Mises have had lasting repercussions in the social sciences.

Specifically, the term is used to connote deterministic, … Expand. View 1 excerpt, cites background. It investigates the concepts of historicism and determinism. The poverty of neorealism. Almost six years ago, E. Thompson fixed his critical sights across the English Channel and let fly with a lengthy polemic entitled The Poverty of Theory. Thompson's immediate target was Louis … Expand.